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The Clash of Scientific Assessors: What the
Conflict over Glyphosate Carcinogenicity
Tells Us about the Relationship between Law
and Science
Vesco PASKALEV*
The recent reauthorisation of glyphosate in the European Union is a uniquely suitable
opportunity to study the relationships between law and science because, unlike many other
controversies that are commonly perceived through the science/democracy dichotomy, in this
case the disagreement was between the “scientific” assessments of two purely “expert”
bodies, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the European Food
Safety Authority (EFSA). This paper takes a close look at some details of the two
assessments to show how scientific assessments are shaped by the legal environment to such
an extent that it is impossible to separate “legal” from “technical” issues at any level; they
are entangled together “all the way down”. Furthermore, it identifies three side effects of
this entanglement that were previously unnoticed. First, obscure legal rules may provide
(usually unintended) leverage to some of the parties. In turn, this forces everybody into proxy
wars on the issue where the leverage is, at the expense of all other concerns that they may
legitimately have. Finally, despite the strict legal regimentation of the scientific assessment,
significant space for judgment remains, and discretion is never removed, only shifted to
different places or levels.
I. INTRODUCTION
The controversy around the carcinogenicity of glyphosate has barely subsided since 2017
when the European Commission reauthorised the herbicide for another five years, and the
main contestants are already embroiled in the next battle.1 This case has generated a
significant amount of academic literature already, so the basic facts are relatively well
known and do not need further elaboration. While most of the ink was spilled on the
question of whether glyphosate is “probably carcinogenic”,2 this article will study
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1 It started officially on 12 December 2019when the Glyphosate Renewal Group filed its application for authorisation
in the post-2022 period.
2 If interested, a summary of the evidence that is readable for non-scientists is available in M Kogevinas, “Probable





















































































































how each of the main players – the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
and the European Food SafetyAuthority (EFSA) – arrived at their respective conclusions,
which in the view of the author is telling for the more general question about the
relationship between “law” and “science”. The most apparent way in which law
shaped the scientific advice is by determining the scope of the safety assessment and,
as we shall see, by making carcinogenicity rather than, say, endocrine disruption
pivotal for the conclusion. In this way, an obscure piece of legislation – the Plant
Protection Products Regulation3 – shaped both the discourse in the public sphere and
the scientific advice. Thus, by studying how IARC and EFSA produced their
respective pieces of scientific advice on the safety of glyphosate, the article will show
how law is entangled with science, determining the scope of scientific assessments and
even the weighting of different types of evidence, what are the implications of this
entanglement for the parties involved and their power and, in turn, how “technical” details
in the decisional framework can have important legal and political consequences. In the
following section (Section II), I shall make several preliminary observations to clear the
way for the main argument developed in the remainder of the article. In Sections III and
IV, I shall look into some details of the decision-making in IARC and EFSA, respectively.
This will hopefully make clear the depth of the entanglement between the legal and the
scientific, which will be further analysed in Section V. Then, I shall identify three
neglected side effects of the science-based risk assessment process, which I shall call
proxy wars, leverage (Section VI) and choice (Section VII).
II. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
With my inquiry so defined, in this section I shall briefly touch upon several issues that
came to the fore in this controversy that are not directly related to the subject yet featured
too prominently to go unmentioned. First, the glyphosate saga was not a conflict between
“science” and “democracy”.4 Unlike other similar controversies (eg genetically modified
organisms (GMOs), hormone-treated beef, “chlorinated chicken”, etc.), in this case the
two camps were organised around two “scientific” agencies. Both IARC and EFSA are
expert, independent and presumably insulated from political influences, yet they came to
uncharacteristically bitter disagreement with each other. Second, in my view, this
disagreement, unseemly as it was, is not a problem. Elsewhere I have argued that,
contrary to the widespread assumption of the universality of science, questions of
safety are very much context-dependent, and therefore it is legitimate for different
assessors to reach different conclusions on what appears to be the same question.5
Academics often note that good decision-making does not mean uncontested
decision-making,6 yet this is against the common understanding of the role of
3 Regulation 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market.
4 The science/democracy dichotomy is a misguided but nevertheless persistent popular explanation of such conflicts.
For comprehensive criticism, see E Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Oxford, Hart
Publishing 2007).
5 V Paskalev, “May Science Be with You: Can Scientific Expertise Confer Legitimacy to Transnational Authority?”
(2017) 8 Transnational Legal Theory 202.
6 See eg Fisher, supra, note 4, pp 252–53.





















































































































“Science”. Characteristically, Bernard Url, the head of EFSA, recently stated, “Good science
is the same all over the world. It does not matter where it is produced”.7 Indeed, in the
established paradigm of “science-based” regulation, Science is usually expected to give
the (one) right answer. As this case demonstrated, this assumption cannot always hold
true, so perhaps it is time for us to abandon it altogether and rethink the science-based
framework that is built on it. This argument, however, is for another day.
The other set of problems raised by this controversy are the alleged bias of the agencies
and the undue influence of the industry on the regulatory process.8 For the present
purposes it is helpful to distinguish between the two, as only the former is directly
relevant. The bias may be an unavoidable feature of the law. Indeed, the Science and
Technology Scholarship (STS) and the Critical Legal Studies before them have amply
demonstrated how apparently neutral rules systematically work to the advantage of
certain interests, and below I shall show how particular provisions of the Plant
Protection Products Regulation privilege certain types of evidence at the expense of
others. On the other hand, in certain cases, certain stakeholders may be able to exert
more influence on the decision-making process, not because of the imperfection of
the rules, but despite the conscious effort of the legislator to prevent such influences.
In this case, the glyphosate authorisation was allegedly vitiated by the undue
influence of its leading producer, Monsanto (now part of Bayer). First, it appeared
that large parts of the Renewal Assessment Report (RAR), prepared by the German
Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) on which EFSA eventually based its
conclusions, were copy–pasted from Monsanto’s application form.9 Second, in the
aftermath of IARCs classification, Monsanto spent some 17 million USD on
manufacturing uncertainty, such as by paying “independent” scientists to publish
peer-reviewed articles critical of IARC.10 Yet, the analysis below should make
clear that the conclusions reached by each agency were shaped by the applicable
regulations in place, and in my view these structural reasons cannot be changed
by BfR cutting corners.11 This is not to say that undue influence is not invidious
7 “EFSA boss: Our advice should not be misused for short-term political interests”, Euractiv, 17 September 2018
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/interview/efsa-boss-our-advice-should-not-be-misused-for-short-
term-political-interests> (last accessed 11 November 2019).
8 This distinction is inspired by, but not identical to, Arcuri’s concept of disinterested interest and her distinction
between interests that are legitimate (eg awareness of the social consequences of scientific conclusions) and vested
interests (eg of regulates). See A Arcuri, “Three Dimensions of Accountability for Global Technocracy” in A Arcuri
and F Coman-Kund (eds), Technocracy and the Law: Accountability, Governance and Expertise (Abingdon,
Routledge 2020).
9 BfR, Renewal Assessment Report (RAR) on the active substance glyphosate prepared by the rapporteur Member
State Germany in the framework of Regulation (EU) No 1141/2010, December 2013. In response to the allegations,
EFSA stated, “If the [assessor] agrees with a particular summary or evaluation it may incorporate the text directly
into the draft assessment report”, see its press release from 22 September 2017 <https://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/170922_glyphosate_statement.pdf> (last accessed on 8 April 2020).
10 See “Monsanto Exec Reveals $17 Million Budget For Anti-IARC, Pro-Glyphosate Efforts” US Right to Know
<https://usrtk.org/monsanto-roundup-trial-tacker/monsanto-executive-reveals-17-million-for-anti-iarc-pro-glyphosate-
efforts> (last accessed 11November 2019). For an academic analysis of the declassified industry documents, see LMcHenry,
“Monsanto papers: Poisoning the scientific well” (2018) 29(3–4) International Journal of Risk and Safety in Medicine 193.
11 In that regard, it is worth noting that the committee established by the European Parliament to investigate the
integrity of the pesticide authorisation process dedicated just one paragraph (no. 51) to plagiarism (perhaps the only
unequivocally critical paragraph in its whole report) while making dozens of recommendations directed at a change
of the evidential basis, weighting of evidence, transparency, etc. See European Parliament resolution of 16 January
2019 on the Union’s authorisation procedure for pesticides (2018/2153(INI)).





















































































































and harmful in other ways and should not be counteracted, but if the analysis below is
correct, the reasons for agencies’ conclusions are systemic rather than contingent on
the pressures on their staff.
Thus, in the view of the author, both agencies were acting as they are required to by the
respective rulebooks and terms of reference, with reasonable levels of integrity,
transparency and accountability. It is ironic that the accounts they were giving
actually fuelled the controversy, as both agencies provided ample epistemic resources
to each other’s critics. Indeed, if the agencies were less open, their conclusions would
be much less vulnerable to contestations by the parties unhappy with the outcome.12
This is not to say that such decisions should be “black-boxed” – although black-boxing
in some cases may be necessary.13 While it is sometimes lamented that transparency
allows for “politicisation” of the expert assessments, I believe the “politicisation” of the
issue in this case would be quite appropriate given the widespread use of the glyphosate
and the far-reaching implications of its (non-)authorisation.
Thirdly, in my view, the biggest problem in this authorisation – and of the risk
regulation regime of the European Union (EU) – was the narrow framing of the
issue, which made the possible carcinogenicity pivotal for the decision and thus led to
two of the undesired effects discussed below – undue leverage and proxy war – while
obscuring many other factors that may have been even more important for some
stakeholders. Indeed, one would expect that as the most popular herbicide in the
world, glyphosate would raise quite a few issues in the course of its reauthorisation.
Although various environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had been
voicing concerns long before 2015, carcinogenicity was not central even for them. For
example, a report by Friends of the Earth (FoE) from 2013 mentioned carcinogenicity
only once, along with a number of other serious issues: endocrine disruption, loss of
farmland biodiversity, water contamination, soil health, etc.14 At that point in time,
FoE was highly concerned about glyphosate, but its demands did not include an
outright ban on glyphosate’s use. There are other reasons for the environmentalists
to dislike glyphosate not explicitly mentioned in the FoE report. The first that comes
to mind is the complementarity between glyphosate and GMOs. The increasing
dependence of farmers and food chains on a single corporation, Monsanto, is another.
Furthermore, glyphosate allows simplified weed management, which favours the
development of large-scale industrial farming; many objections are raised against this –
monocultures (“green deserts”) are detrimental to biodiversity, displace small-scale
farmers and whole communities, etc. There is also the concern that heavy use of
pesticides breeds resistance, so a “safe” herbicide-resistant crop locks farmers, the
biotech industry and regulators in a cycle of competition between evolution and
innovation. The self-sustaining growth of demand for pesticides is much welcomed
12 Cf Fisher, who also notes that transparency creates more possibilities for contestation, even though it may have
been introduced with the aim to build confidence; see E Fisher, “Transparency and Administrative Law: A Critical
Evaluation” (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 272.
13 See the discussion in S Jasanoff, “Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits” (2006) 69 Law and
Contemporary Problems 21.
14 Friends of the Earth Europe, “Glyphosate –Media Briefing. Reasons for concern”, 2013 <http://www.foeeurope.
org/glyphosate-reasons-for-concern-briefing-130613> (last accessed 27 March 2018). See also the accompanying,
more detailed documents available there.





















































































































by the industry, but progressively increases the effects on the environment well beyond
the initial estimates. Next, the risk for particularly vulnerable groups, such as the residents
in the vicinity of the sprayed fields, seems to be completely beyond the radar of both
researchers and regulators.15 Last but not least, many people would consider the presence
of glyphosate in our bodies as an issue of its own: even if it were completely harmless,
we may not want it trusted into our bodies without anyone’s consent.16
Readers should be forgiven if they have not heard any of these concerns voiced in the
glyphosate reauthorisation debate. This is so because carcinogenicity took up almost all
of the space in the public sphere. One does not need to agree with any of the concerns
above to accept that they are legitimate factors to be considered before the decision to
authorise glyphosate for the next 15 years throughout the continent is taken. Yet,
under the existing “science-based” risk regulation paradigm, such considerations are
all but excluded from the decision-making process.17 The focus on carcinogenicity
took the attention away even from the precious little that could have been taken into
account. It is important to emphasise that glyphosate protestors themselves focused
on carcinogenicity alone, disregarding any other concerns they may have, because the
availability of harmful effects on humans, animals and the environment is the only
thing that really matters,18 and, as we shall see, carcinogenicity alone could warrant
an outright ban. This framing of risk analysis has been subject to various criticisms as
soon as the current paradigm for risk analysis took shape,19 yet it is adhered to throughout
the world with remarkable persistence. It has also been noted that this framing, and in
particular the arbitrary but nonetheless rigid division between risk assessment and risk
management, shifts decision-making power upstream (ie to the earlier stages of the risk
analysis), to less accountable and more obscure bodies. What is less well understood is
that this system hides discretion, gives unaccounted and arbitrary advantages to some
stakeholders and forces everybody into proxy wars. That is, instead of a robust public
debate (or contestation) on all of the issues that the various stakeholders are concerned
about, they are all forced to cling to a much narrower subset of issues that pass as
“scientific”. The glyphosate saga highlighted these three effects – choice, leverage and
15 SeeGDowns, “It’s not just glyphosate and neonicotinoids!Whywe need a pesticide-free future”, The Ecologist, 30
April 2015.
16 Cf D Chalmers, “Risk, Anxiety and the European Mediation of the Politics of Life” (2005) 30 European Law
Review 649.
17 As a matter of law, the “other factors” must be taken into account, yet they rarely are – a recent evaluation of the
GFL states that “EU riskmanagers have considered other legitimate factors in addition to the scientific opinions of EFSA
in deciding the appropriate measures to be taken in very few cases”. See “Executive summary of the REFIT evaluation of
the General Food Law”, {SWD(2018) 38 final}, emphasis in the original. It is unclear whether the European
Commission considers this to be a problem or a virtue of the regime. I focus on this issue in a companion piece
currently under review in another publication. For a more general discussion, see M Lee, “Beyond Safety? The
Broadening Scope of Risk Regulation” (2009) 62 Current Legal Problems 242.
18 See the approval criteria in Art 4(3) of the Plant Protection Products Regulation. Further to the effect on humans,
animals and the environment, the plant protection product must be effective (Art 4(3)(a)) and shall not cause unnecessary
suffering of the target species (Art 4(3)(d)).
19 See S Jasanoff, “Relating Risk Assessment and Risk Management” (1993) 19 EPA Journal 37, for one of the early
criticisms; for a comprehensive analysis and an alternative paradigm, see Fisher, supra, note 4. For yet other proposed
alternatives, see O Renn and KD Walker (eds), Global Risk Governance: Concept and Practice Using the IRGC
Framework (Berlin, Springer 2008); M Dreyer and O Renn, “EFSA’s Involvement Policy: Moving towards an
Analytic-Deliberative Process in EU Food Safety Governance ?” in C Holst (ed.), Expertise and Democracy (Oslo,
ARENA Reports 2014) pp 323–52.





















































































































proxy wars – and in the remainder of this article, I shall take a close look at the respective
decisions of IARC and EFSA to demonstrate these effects.
The final preliminary issue to be noted is that this article is meant to be analytical rather
than normative. I aim to show the interplay between law and science and will refrain from
making any recommendations (except for where I consider possible alternatives only to
make a point clearer). I believe that what the case study below demonstrates can be
generalised to other instances of regulatory science. On the other hand, as a study of
law in action, it is not for the present paper to discuss the reforms of the General
Food Law (GFL) and related legislation introduced in 201920 in response to the
problems highlighted by the glyphosate authorisation. This would take another case
study, possibly of the next glyphosate reauthorisation battle that is now underway.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER
IARC is an independent organisation within the framework of the World Health
Organisation (WHO) based in Lyon, France. It sets up Working Groups of experts
vetted for conflicts of interest who review the available scientific literature and convene
for a week-long workshop where they aim to reach conclusions by consensus as to the
possible carcinogenic effect of the assessed substance.21 IARC’s detractors are keen to
point out that it has classified as possible carcinogens red meat, night shifts and
hairdressing, and that during its entire history it classified as safe (ie “probably not
carcinogenic”) only one substance. The latter is rhetorically effective, but it may not
show the bias it is meant to, but rather that the substances that were prioritised for
assessment were selected wisely. Most importantly, IARC is not a regulator and its
decisions are not binding on anyone. Yet as Arcuri notes, it exercises a form of “liquid
authority”, and its opinions have significant effects in the legal realm.22
In 2014, a panel within IARC identified glyphosate as a substance of interest and
assigned the review to a working group of 17 scientists; the concluding meeting of
the latter was held on 3–10 March 2015 and the consensus conclusions were publicly
announced on 20 March.23 The verdict was that there is “limited evidence” for
20 See the European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 April 2019 on the proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the
food chain amending Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 [on general food law], Directive 2001/18/EC [on the deliberate
release into the environment of GMOs], Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 [on GM food and feed], Regulation (EC)
No 1831/2003 [on feed additives], Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 [on smoke flavourings], Regulation (EC) No
1935/2004 [on food contact materials], Regulation (EC) No 1331/2008 [on the common authorisation procedure for
food additives, food enzymes and food flavourings], Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 [on plant protection products]
and Regulation (EU) No 2015/2283 [on novel foods] [2019] 2018/0088(COD).
21 There are five categories: carcinogenic to humans; probably carcinogenic; possibly carcinogenic; not classifiable as
carcinogenic; and probably not carcinogenic. Details of the procedure are available on the IARC website, see
<monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/currenta6work0706.php>.
22 A Arcuri, “Glyphosate” in J Homan and D Joyce (eds), International Law’s Objects (Oxford, Oxford University
Press 2019) pp 234–46.
23 For a summary see KZ Guyton, D Loomis, Y Grosse, F El Ghissassi, C Scoccianti, H Mattock, K Straif, on behalf
of IARCWG, “Carcinogenicity of tetrachlorvinphos, parathion, malathion, diazinon, and glyphosate” (2015) 16(5) The
Lancet Oncology 490. For the full Monograph, see IARC/WHO, “IARC Monographs: Some Organophosphate
Insecticides and Herbicides” Volume 112, 2017 <http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/vol112/index.php>
(last accessed 7 November 2019).





















































































































carcinogenicity in humans, “sufficient evidence” for carcinogenicity in animals and
“strong evidence” for genotoxicity. This warranted classification of glyphosate as
“probably carcinogenic for humans”.
Several specific features of IARC should be noted. It takes into consideration only
studies that are published after peer review.24 In this it is quite different from the
regulators, which rely also, and often predominantly, on studies conducted or
commissioned by the industry. Such studies are generally not available to IARC.25
Second, IARC’s job is hazard identification, which is only the first part of the
standard risk assessment.26 That is, it establishes the possibility for the substance to
cause cancer, and the differences in its classification reflect only how certain the
evidence for causal effect is, not the probability of the harm occurring. For the latter,
account must also be taken of the dose response and the exposure, and this is done in
risk assessment, which is usually conducted by regulatory bodies such as EFSA.27
The next key feature of IARC assessments is that it assesses both the active
substances and the commercially available compounds, while EFSA considers only
the former. As will be seen below, this difference in the subject matter entails
differences in the epistemic base (ie the studies that can be taken into account).
Certainly, these differences are based on the operational context of IARC and EFSA
and, of course, have their legal basis in their foundational legal documents. Their
importance cannot be overestimated because it is well known that this whole
controversy pivoted on which studies could be taken into account and which could
not. It is worth noting that these differences do not reflect apparent political choices:
IARC’s selection of studies does not reflect directly any values or bigger issues that
may or may not be shared by its members. It merely reflects its foundational
documents. Yet even though these rules are meant to ensure the independence and
“objectivity” of the assessments, they are by no means neutral to the content thereof.
Finally, it bears repetition that IARC’s decisions do not bind anyone and do not have
any direct policy consequences. IARC is in the rather unique position of not facing
any trade-offs and it does not need to balance economic, social and health concerns.
Notwithstanding this, IARC’s conclusions on glyphosate were far from indisputable. It
is hardly surprising that they were challenged by the industry, but they were also disputed
by scientific regulators all over the world, and the exchange with EFSA was particularly
bitter. One could naively expect that in the Republic of Science28 expert advisors would
be ready to accept each other’s findings and to disagree only when an error is found. Any
such disagreement would be temporary, lasting only until it is publicly exposed and the
error corrected.Moreover, these expert advisorsmay have different epistemic policies (eg
err on the safe side, delay decision until more data become available, etc.) depending on
the known consequences of their decisions.
24 The entire assessment process at IARC is governed by the Preamble to its Monograph programmes, see IARC
Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, Preamble 2006, p 4.
25 Note, however, that it may take such studies into account if their main findings become publicly available, such as
when submitted to another regulator (eg the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as will be seen below).
26 The other three being dose–response characterisation, exposure assessment and risk characterisation.
27 Strictly speaking, EFSA is not a regulator, as its opinions are only advisory – see below.
28 M Polanyi, “The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory” (1962) 1 Minerva 54.





















































































































While IARC takes pride in its transparency, integrity and independence, when the
stakes are high, no authority is contestation proof. It came under fire as soon as it
came into the limelight with its glyphosate classification,29 and it faced allegations of
conflicts of interest. The allegation that is relevant for the present article concerned
the exclusion of a major study. The Agricultural Health Study (AHS) is a decade-
long prospective research study conducted in the USA with nearly 90,000 farmers.
An early publication (2005) based on this study found that “glyphosate exposure was
not associated with cancer incidence overall”.30 Since then, significant amounts of
further data were gathered, adding more power to this finding. Allegedly, by 2013,
this finding was clear to the researchers conducting the study, but it was not published
until 2018. Crucially, one of the researchers, Dr Aaron Blair, was the chair of the IARC
Working Group on glyphosate. Yet the new findings were not taken into account by the
Working Group as the study was not yet published then, which is a key condition
under IARC rules. Dr Blair did not even orally report the findings to his colleagues.
While publishing results does take years, and such a huge research project yields
many different results competing for researchers’ attention, an investigation by Kate
Kelland hints that it might be the case that Dr Blair was in a position to set the
priorities and may have delayed this one to prevent its inclusion in the IARC
review.31 On the other hand, this particular publication might have not made any
difference, as IARC and EFSA were in agreement that the AHS research revealed no
significant association between glyphosate and cancer.32 What is interesting for the
present research is that if there had been foul play in this case at all, it would have
been made possible by a rule meant to increase the transparency of IARC. On the
other hand, the trickery could become visible only because this rule was in place –
such gaming of the system in other agencies could go on unnoticed. IARC issued
several statements describing all of the allegations as misleading or false.33 On the
issue regarding Dr Blair, IARC points to evidence that his views remained unaffected by
the subsequent publication of the study. While the reader may interpret this (and all other
controversial details) in light of their own beliefs and find faults and biases with each
29 See supra, note 10.
30 AJ De Roos et al, “Cancer incidence among glyphosate-exposed pesticide applicators in the Agricultural Health
Study” (2005) 113(1) Environmental Health Perspectives 49.
31 K Kelland, “Cancer agency left in the dark over glyphosate evidence”, Reuters, 14 June 2017 <https://www.
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/glyphosate-cancer-data> (last accessed 11 November 2019). Note, however,
that Kelland herself was accused of spinning the evidence that was not obtained from court depositions as she
claimed, but provided by Monsanto. See C Gillam, “New Monsanto Documents Expose Cozy Relationship to
Reuters Reporter”, US Right To Know, 25 April 2019 <https://usrtk.org/monsanto-roundup-trial-tacker/new-
monsanto-documents-expose-cozy-connection-to-reuters-reporter> (last accessed 11 November 2019).
32 E Bozzini, “Contrasting norms on the use of evidence in risk assessment: the controversy surrounding the
carcinogenicity of glyphosate” (2020) Health Risk and Society (forthcoming). Note also that the AHS research is
far from being undisputed evidence for the safety of glyphosate. As Portier and colleagues note, “the median
follow-up time in the AHS was 6.7 years, which is unlikely to be long enough to account for cancer latency”, see
Portier et al, infra, note 72, p 743. It is also based on data from the USA, and there are no data for low- or middle-
income countries where glyphosate’s use is highest; see Kogevinas, supra, note 2.
33 See eg “IARC response to criticisms of the Monographs and the glyphosate evaluation” from January 2018
<https://www.iarc.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/IARC_response_to_criticisms_of_the_Monographs_and_the_
glyphosate_evaluation.pdf> (last accessed 4 April 2020).





















































































































side, what is important for the purposes of the present study is that IARC and its Working
Group were strictly adhering to their respective rules.
Further to this, IARC’s critics claim that its approach is lacking scientific rigour
because its Working Groups include scientists who are reviewing their own
research.34 For our purposes, it is important to note how integrity rules subtly shape
the epistemic base of the final conclusions. It is almost by definition that the experts
on an issue have conducted key studies of this issue themselves. Removing them, or
their studies, will either deprive the decision-making body of key experts or key
pieces of research. In any event, the head of IARC’s monograph programme Kurt
Straif claims that this is controlled for by IARC’s rules. They provide that, first, the
authors cannot directly evaluate their own studies and, second, the involvement of
20–30 people in the discussions neutralises individual interests.35 IARC stands behind
its classification, but remains isolated: regulators around the world conducted own
assessments and reached opposite conclusions. In the same year, the US Environment
Protection Agency (EPA) decided that glyphosate is not carcinogenic, and so did BfR
conducting preparatory work for EFSA.
IV. EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY
EFSA is one of the stronger agencies in the EU, having been set up to advise the
Commission on a wide variety of issues, some of which may be only indirectly
related to food and feed (eg bisphenol A). Its job is to conduct risk assessments as advice
to the Commission and/or the Member States (ie the national experts in the comitology
committees) who are the risk managers. Although its opinions are not binding, the
Commission tends to follow them, and it often claims that it is obliged to do so.36
Its independence is contested. Perhaps it is the most institutionally independent of all
EU agencies, as the 14 members of its Management Board are not representatives of the
Member States (which is the case for most newer agencies).37 There is one Commission
representative and four representatives of consumer or other stakeholder organisations,
and the remaining nine are independent experts. But its independence from the market
players has generated quite a lot controversies and at least one major scandal. On the one
34 RE Tarone, “On the International Agency for Research on Cancer Classification of Glyphosate as a Probable
Human Carcinogen” (2018) 27 European Journal of Cancer Prevention 82. See also K Kelland, “How the World
Health Organization’s cancer agency confuses consumers”, Reuters, 18 April 2016 <https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/health-who-iarc> (last accessed 4 April 2020).
35 Kelland, supra, note 31.
36 TheGFL obliges the Commission to consider but not to follow EFSA’s advice. However, inPfizer (T-99/2000), the
General Court held that in order to deviate from the received advice, Union institutions must justify their choice with
scientific evidence of the same quality, which in most cases will be a tall order. Indeed, on a number of occasions,
Commission officials have made public statements that they are obliged to follow such “advice”. For further
discussion, see V Paskalev, “GMO Regulation in Europe: Undue Delegation, Abdication or Design Flaw?” (2015)
5(4) European Journal of Risk Regulation 573.
37 Many studies found that EU agencies, EFSA included, are subject to much tighter control by the Commission than
the formal rules provide, see M Busuioc, “Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of European Agencies”
(2009) 15 European Law Journal 599, and, more recently, E Vos, “EU Agencies and Independence” in D Ritleng (ed.),
Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the EuropeanUnion (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2016)
pp 206–28.





















































































































hand, EFSA’s internal rules and procedures for dealing with conflicts of interest have
been strengthened progressively (with the latest round of amendments adopted in
June 2017) and appear to be quite rigorous. Thus, in a recent review of the GFL, the
Commission boasted that “EFSA has one of the most advanced and robust systems
ensuring its independence”.38 On the other hand, there were a number of examples of
revolving doors, one of which made headlines across the world in 2012. It turned out
that Diána Bánáti, chair of EFSA’s Management Board, failed to disclose that she
was a member of the board of International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) Europe, an
industry-sponsored association promoting the products EFSA is called upon to assess.
She left ILSI after the link was exposed by a Green MEP, but the pressure in the
European Parliament continued, so she resigned from EFSA to become : : : a director
of ILSI.39 This might be only the tip of the iceberg. In 2017, Corporate Europe
Observatory, an NGO, identified that nearly half of the EFSA staff had some links to
industry.40 While this is very worrisome, perhaps it should be taken with a pinch of
salt. As Vos notes, “it is at the same time also evident that in practice scientists of
good repute who could serve on staff committees of agencies will always be likely to
be or have been involved in industry or national affairs”.41 This is similar to the
objections raised against IARC’s experts, and although in this case no question of the
exclusion of studies arises, once again we are facing integrity rules that determine
who can sit on the panels and whose expertise must be excluded. Indeed, expertise is
usually accompanied by interest, so it may be difficult to find a microbiologist with
expertise on, say, GMOs who has not been involved in the development of one. Even
if there is someone who conducted their research in academia only and with no
external funding – something increasingly difficult by itself – the nature of their
occupation is very likely to prejudice them to favour commercialisation of the
product they have spent their lives working on. Similarly, it would be very difficult to
find a biologist researching certain animal species who has no strong feelings for the
conservation of these species. Thus, the specific disciplinary interest of the experts
involved may bias them towards certain decisions even more decisively than any
direct links with former employers. As Arcuri suggests, in the latter case, at least in
principle experts may be able to act as if they were disinterested by allowing data to
carry the day.42 On the other hand, the values that experts embrace, as a matter of
disciplinary commitment, are likely to make a more lasting difference. For example, a
microbiologist is likely to value innovation, an agronomist to value increasing crop
yield and an environmental expert to value conservation. Depending on their
respective representation on agencies’ panels, the scientific conclusions of the
latter may be different. Crucially, these disciplinary biases may very well be legitimate,
as they embody ethical values that are recognised parts of their respective disciplines.
Thus, it may be pointless to search for “an independent expert”: the best that we can do
38 Executive summary of the REFIT Review, supra, note 17.
39 As a follow-up to this scandal, EFSA amended its rules to include two-year cooling-off periods.
40 COE, “Recruitment Errors”, 17 June 2017 <https://corporateeurope.org/efsa/2017/06/recruitment-errors> (last
accessed 11 November 2019).
41 Vos, supra, note 37.
42 See Arcuri, supra, note 8.





















































































































is to make all such biases visible and to seek their diversification on the relevant boards and
panels. Rather than insulating such panels, we should be seeking to reconstruct a “view
from everywhere”within them.43 If the latter were the case, only covert interests would be
problematic. Once again, the legal rules that determine who can sit on EFSA’s
Management Board and scientific panels affect the type of expertise that is deployed
and therefore the content of the conclusions.
The differences between the set of studies that are taken into account by IARC and
EFSA were already discussed, but now we need to reconsider them with regards to
EFSA’s aims and foundational regulations.44 Perhaps the most widely discussed
difference was that EFSA possesses and must take into account proprietary studies
conducted by the applicant. Paradoxically, while this is the biggest source of criticism
of EFSA’s decision, this is also its main defence: it might be that as a matter of law
these studies ought to have greater weight than the academic literature, and in any
event this, is how the Commission interprets the law. As the recent REFIT review of
the GFL45 states:
As regards risk assessment in the context of authorisation dossiers, EFSA is bound
by strict confidentiality rules and by the legal requirement to primarily base its
assessment on industry studies, laid down in the GFL Regulation and in the
multiple authorisation procedures in specific EU food legislation. These elements
lead civil society to perceive a certain lack of transparency and independence,
having a negative impact on the acceptability of EFSA’s scientific work by the
general public. There is therefore a need to address these issues in order to
protect the reputation of EFSA’s work.46
I have difficulties in finding where the GFL requires EFSA to base its assessment
“primarily” on industry studies (“guideline studies”), but systematic interpretation of
the Plant Protection Products Regulation suggests that this could be the case for
pesticides. Article 8 of the latter provides quite comprehensive requirements for the
content of the application dossiers and is clearly focused on the data that are to be
gathered by the applicant. Only its very last paragraph says that “scientific peer-
reviewed open literature : : : published within the last 10 years : : : shall be added by
the applicant to the dossier”.47 While this may be understood to give certain priority
to the industry studies to provide the minimum baseline data, it is far from clear that
these studies should be given preference when other data are available. On the
43 For the phrase “view from everywhere”, credit must be given to S Jasanoff, Science and Public Reason (London,
Earthscan 2012) p 74; S Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States
(Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press 2005) p 267, although she uses it with a somewhat different meaning.
44 For a more detailed comparison of the sets of studies, see Bozzini, supra, note 32. As she notes, where studies were
available to both IARC and EFSA, the assessments of their merits and limits by each agency largely coincide; however,
the two agencies followed different rules for weighting the reliability, relevance and consistency of these studies.
45 Regulation 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European
Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety.
46 REFIT evaluation, supra, note 17, emphasis in the original.
47 Although the heavy reliance on industry studies was one of the main criticisms of the current authorisations, and
one of the three key demands of the European Citizens’ Initiative “Ban Glyphosate” was to see this remedied, the
amendments adopted in 2019 (supra, note 20) did not change this provision.





















































































































contrary, inParaquat,48 the General Court annulled the authorisation of a herbicide partly
because the Commission failed to take into account several third-party studies.
Notwithstanding these disagreements, if this is how priorities are understood by the
Commission, there is little reason to expect that EFSA’s panels are doing something
different. As we shall see below, in the case of glyphosate, five industry studies were
“key” and “pivotal” for EFSA’s conclusion.49 Thus, it turns out that one particular
interpretation of a single article in the relevant law predetermines which scientific
study will carry the day. Notice that if the Commission or the Court were to change
their views, the weighting of the studies could be different, and the conclusions of the
“Science” as represented by EFSA could be entirely different.
V. ENTANGLEMENT
The detailed scrutiny of the way IARC and EFSA arrived at their conclusions provided in
the preceding two sections already suggested that the entanglement between “law” and
“science” goes very deep. This section will zoom in on this entanglement. First, it was
seen that the very rules that serve to establish the integrity of the expert agencies and to
ensure the highest quality of their expertise are not neutral to the substance of the
scientific conclusions. Law provides criteria for the inclusion and exclusion of studies,
and thus precisely delineates the epistemic basis for the scientific conclusions. Furthermore,
there are regulations precisely delimiting the competences of the agencies (ie what issues
theymay ormay not consider) that reflect the operational principles of the broader system
each agency is embedded into. There are also the rules defining who can and who cannot
sit on the respective panels, letting in certain types of expertise (eg how many
microbiologists) and certain types of interests while excluding others (eg do
representatives of civil society or the regulated industry get invited for consultations?).
There are the guidelines to structure experts’ discretion that prevent them from choosing
or weighing conflicting evidence arbitrarily. There are the requirements for the form and
content of the guideline studies provided by the applicant50 and for the final decision
issued by the agency. Thus, contrary to the common understanding that expert advisors
speak for some universal “Science”, the legal rules to a great extent determine the
scientific conclusions. While the scientists and the experts may have little direct interest
in or understanding of law and politics, they are fully embedded in the respective legal
environment and every step in their work is controlled by the law.51
That “scientific” is entangled with the “legal” and “political” has been robustly
demonstrated by decades of research in STS. Yet outside of STS circles, this is
48 Case T-229/04 Sweden v. Commission (2007).
49 Words of José Tarazona, the Head of EFSA’s Pesticides Unit, quoted by Corporate Europe Observatory, available
at <https://corporateeurope.org/efsa/2016/02/key-evidence-withheld-trade-secret-eus-controversial-risk-assessment-
glyphosate> (last accessed 8 November 2019).
50 See Commission Regulation (EU) No 283/2013 of 1 March 2013 setting out the data requirements for active
substances.
51 In a rare explicit recognition of this, one of the members of the EFSA Management Board, Andres Szekacs, stated
that “[EFSA] cannot consider everything for legal reasons”, EFSA, 67thManagement BoardMeeting, 3 December 2015
<www.efsa.europa.eu/en/events/event/151203#playaudio> (last accessed 25 April 2018). I am grateful to Alessandra
Arcuri for this reference.





















































































































usually understood merely to mean that the line between science and law must be either
“reinforced” and/or drawn on a different place or at a different level. The glyphosate case
stands out because two purely “scientific” agencies have reached opposite conclusions
and, by focusing on the legal reasons for reaching these scientific conclusions, the present
article hopes to have made clear that law and science are intertwined at every level, “all
the way down”. While we can distinguish law and science with a significant intellectual
and oftentimes legal effort, they remain entangled pretty much like the fish and the birds
in an Escher drawing (Figure 1). While in Figure 1 we can identify both the birds and the
fish and tell one from the other, if we try to remove the fish, the birds also disappear (and
vice versa). Similarly, if we want to remove the legal from the scientific, the latter would
collapse into the opposite of science.52 Certainly, if we want to remove the science, the
law would also lose its subject matter and vanish into thin air.
VI. LEVERAGE AND PROXY WARS
As was mentioned above, initially carcinogenicity was not the main concern for the
glyphosate protestors – it used to be just one concern amongst many. Furthermore,
before 2015, these protestors insisted only on regular monitoring of its levels in food
and the environment, for the adoption of glyphosate reduction programmes and for
only certain uses (eg for desiccation) to be prohibited. What made carcinogenicity
Figure 1. © M.C. Escher, Bird Fish (1938).
52 This obviously applies to “regulatory science”, which is the subject of this article, but “pure” science is not much
different in the sense that it also relies on elaborate protocols and standards for quality, robustness and rigour. One may
argue that, unlike law, these are internal and belong to the scientific field itself, but the division between internal and
external would be no less problematic than the division between science and law.





















































































































central and overwhelming in the worldwide public debate was not the evidence that was
available at the time, but an obscure provision in the relevant EU legislation.
The Plant Protection Products Regulation seems to suggest that if a pesticide is
formally classified as carcinogenic, then it cannot be authorised. While its Article 4
stipulates that EFSA must consider any “immediate or delayed harmful effects”, and
this seems to provide for some discretion, according to Annex II, 3.6.3, substances
shall be approved only if, on the basis of the appropriate assessment, they are not
classified as a category 1A or 1B carcinogen (exceptions apply).53
Thus, if glyphosate protestors could prove that glyphosate is carcinogenic, they could
both scale up their demands and have a clear pathway to win on them. Annex II, perhaps
unwittingly for its drafter, provided the protestors with leverage. Although this was but
one issue within the big picture, some evidence for it could push the lever and bring about
a planetary change.
Indeed, Annex II, 3.6.3 made it impossible for the producers to live with the claim that
glyphosate is probably carcinogenic.54 They had to do all that they could to undermine
IARC’s claim (and did not have to bother very much with addressing any of the other
concerns; nor had they to extoll any of its benefits). On the other hand, the
environmentalists could seize the opportunity IARC had unexpectedly provided to
contest the reauthorisation of glyphosate on this ground alone. And, of course, this
particular ground would be perfectly sufficient for the regulators to act or not to act.
Thus, all sides in the controversy had to make carcinogenicity a proxy for everything
else that was at stake. This was acknowledged by EFSA’s head, Bernhard Url, who
complained in an opinion piece in Nature that scientific assessment suffers when
“questions about a society’s values are thrust onto scientific agencies rather than elected
officials”.55 He further argued that “when campaigners allege that EFSA did not follow
due scientific process when assessing glyphosate : : : they are really railing against
bigger issues: the role of modern agricultural practices and multinational biotech
firms in our food supply”. I suspect that this is true, but I part company with Dr
Url where he insists that elected officials and regulatory agencies have separate
jobs that can and should be insulated from each other.56 To Dr Url’s possible
dismay, the legal and the scientific are entangled “all the way down”, and any
53 While EFSA normally conducts risk assessments, the conclusions on carcinogenicity (as well as reproductive
toxicity, neurotoxicity and endocrine effect) are hazard-based, and they appear to have lexical priority over the risk
assessment conclusions. See A Székács and B Darvas, “Re-Registration Challenges of Glyphosate in the European
Union” (2018) 6 Frontiers in Environmental Science 1, 22. Note also that although it is normally for the European
Chemicals Agency (ECHA) to classify carcinogens, in this case EFSA was initially mandated to assess
carcinogenicity, and ECHA’s subsequent assessment appears to have been somewhat facultative.
54 This might have been so even without the said provision, as the “uncertainty paradox” suggests that risk producers,
risk protestors and regulators become intolerant to any risk; seeMBAvanAsselt and EVos, “EURisk Regulation and the
Uncertainty Challenge” in S Roeser, R Hillerbrand, P Sandin and M Peterson (eds), Handbook of Risk Theory:
Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk (Berlin, Springer 2012) pp 1119–36, 1128.
Yet it is plausible to expect that the degree of their intolerance is not unrelated to the rigidity of the assessment regime.
55 B Url, “Don’t attack science agencies for political gain” (2018) 553 Nature 381.
56 Indeed, the relevant legislation does separate risk assessment from risk management and “the bigger issues” (ie the
non-scientific factors are to be considered only in the latter). However, it is uncertain whether this ever happens; see, eg,
M Kritikos, “Traditional Risk Analysis and Releases of GMOs into the European Union: Space for Non-Scientific
Factors?” (2009) 34 European Law Review 405. Moreover, as Fisher notes, any opening of the scientific models
awakens resentment and creates opportunities for the contestation of their legitimacy; see Fisher, supra, note 12, p 303.





















































































































attempt to insulate “science” further would inevitably take the form of law, thus
increasing rather than curbing the entanglement.
There are two problems with the leverage effect. The first is the elevation of one
consideration – important as it is – to the status of a trump card at the expense of all
other legitimate considerations. The second is the arbitrariness. Such leverages may
make favours to one party or another at random, or they may systematically favour
one of the parties: either way is normatively problematic.57 While every rule may, in
certain circumstances, provide leverage to someone and therefore this effect cannot be
avoided ex ante, we should do a better job in recognising this effect and reflect on
whether it works for our set normative goals or against them.
With the proxy wars, the first problem is that transparency is lost. We, the public, can
see only the arguments of each side on the proxy issue, while most of the other relevant
factors remain unheard of and often unmentioned. The other problem is substantive: the
grounds for the ultimate decision are severely distorted. Indeed, the proxy issue may be
less significant than many others that would warrant different outcomes if they had only
seen the light of day.58 Furthermore, the issues cannot cumulate: whoever wins the proxy
war wins it all.59
VII. CHOICE
One may think that the legal regimentation of scientific assessments at every level
reduces or removes the discretion from the system. This impression may well be
reinforced by the way rules may be leveraged to force unexpected and momentous
outcomes. Yet the careful reader should have noticed that at many points judgment
and choice remain in the system. Choice is present at two levels. First, there is
always space for the individual experts to interpret results, to trust one study more
than another, etc. Second, when their choice is constrained by rules (or institutional
context) – such as the preference for published or industry studies – in such cases the
choice has already been made at the design level. At both levels the agents may
genuinely believe that they are “objective”; they may well be unaware even that there
is any other way to do their thing. Both the judgments they make and the rules they
follow, by definition, prefer one type of expertise to another, one threshold to
another, one scale of measurement to another, and as we have seen above, these are
57 For example, it has been shown that the system for GMO evaluation systematically favours the industry side; see P
Anderson, “What Rights Are Eclipsed When Risk Is Defined by Corporatism? Governance and GM Food” (2004) 21
Theory, Culture & Society 155. More recently, see L Levidow, “Substituting a Fictional ‘Science’ for Public
Accountability: Legitimacy Problems of the EU’s Regulatory Framework for GM Products” in LE San-Epifanio
(ed.), Towards a New Regulatory Framework for GM Crops in the European Union (Wageningen, Wageningen
Academic Publishers 2017) pp 155–66. Note, however, that sometimes we may have good reasons to design the
system to favour one party. An example of this is the precautionary principle, which is meant to give leverage to
those who speak for the environment.
58 Cf Lee, supra, note 17, p 277: “The false accountability provided by risk might lead to premature closure of the
political debate, encouraging a sometimes sterile debate on competing science”.
59 In the author’s personal experience, risk protestors have acquiesced to this travesty of science-based risk analysis to
a great extent. They have internalised the view that only hard science matters, so much so that a prominent environmental
organisation rejected a paid report on GMO regulation where I made a similar argument for fear of appearing “anti-
science”. The report was later published by another organisation; see V Paskalev, “An Assessment of Current
Regulation of GMOs in the EU and Proposals for Amending It”, The Greenhouse Report Series (2016) <www.
greenhousethinktank.org/uploads/4/8/3/2/48324387/gm_inner.pdf> (last accessed 4 April 2020).





















































































































not neutral to the outcome. The glyphosate saga provides three neat examples that
illustrate the irredeemable choices at each level.
1. The importance of dead mice
The first of the five industry studies that were pivotal for the EFSA decision60 was
conducted as early as 1983 in preparation for the initial authorisation application in
the USA.61 It provides a particularly vivid illustration of discretion at the individual
level. The competent authority in America – EPA – initially understood the study as
showing some carcinogenic effect at higher exposure levels, so it classified
glyphosate as possibly carcinogenic to humans. Three years later, EPA – after some
exchanges with Monsanto62 – agreed that the findings were not unequivocal, so they
consented to classifying glyphosate as safe, but insisted that the study be repeated.63
Monsanto balked, and by 1991, EPA dropped its demand, thus clearing glyphosate
completely. As IARC obtained the study through EPA, it could take it into account
and interpret it as showing carcinogenic effect.64 The same study was interpreted yet
again by EFSA, but favourably. The point to take home from this example, however,
is not that the agencies and the experts working in them were choosing their
interpretations according to their liking.65 It only shows that the scientific conclusions
were not as hard and fast as lawyers and laymen alike tend to believe.
Notwithstanding their dependence on data – mice tissue in this case – they are also a
matter of judgment, judgment informed by the full array of evidence available to the
experts who make them, as well as their disciplinary commitments,66 and, of course,
by their individual professional experience. I shall return to this below.
2. Vice and virtue of guideline studies
As we saw, EFSA is required to prefer industry studies to academic literature, a design
choice that is particularly controversial.67 Three other pivotal studies that are more recent
60 See the text accompanying note 49.
61 A Knezevich and G Hogan, “A Chronic Feeding Study of Glyphosate (Roundup Technical) in Mice: Project No.
77-2061: BDN-77420. Final rept. (Unpublished study received Aug 17, 1983 under 524-308; prepared byBio/dynamics,
Inc., submitted by Monsanto Co., Washington, DC; CDL:251007-A; 251008; 251009; 251010; 251011;
251012;251013;251014; (MRID 00130406)” (1983).
62 Letters available at the US Right to Know website, see links from “Of Mice, Monsanto and a Mysterious Tumor”
<https://usrtk.org/pesticides/of-mice-monsanto-and-a-mysterious-tumor> (last accessed 11 November 2019).
63 If one is wondering, the reasonwhy two diametrically opposing interpretations of the same study are possible is that
the mice were given glyphosate at doses of 150, 1500 or 4500 mg/kg body weight per day, and negative effects were
observed in males at the highest dose only. Thus, one can validly conclude both that “glyphosate is carcinogenic” and
that “lower doses are safe”. But then the question of safety hinges onwhat the actual exposures are, and these vary widely
and necessitate entirely different types of expertise in order to be determined.
64 IARC, Monograph 112 (2017), p 394.
65 Nor, in the view of the present author, does it show the biases that the agencies are respectively accused of.
66 See the discussion on disciplinary interests in Section IV.
67 That is why the European Citizens’ Initiative “Ban Glyphosate” demanded that “the scientific evaluation of
pesticides for EU regulatory approval is based only on published studies, which are commissioned by competent
public authorities instead of the pesticide industry”. The reforms that were eventually adopted in 2019 (note 20)
stopped quite short of this, providing only for publication of the industry studies and public register for all industry
research so that unfavourable findings cannot be withheld.





















































































































remain unpublished,68 and they were made available to EFSA (and EPA), but could not
be taken into consideration by IARC. As they were not subject to any peer review, their
only quality imprimatur is the compliance with the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guideline 451 and Good Laboratory Practice
(GLP) guidelines.69 While it is far from certain whether peer review per se is a
guarantee of quality and reliability,70 the publication and availability of the raw data
are key factors in ensuring that misinterpretation, errors and fraud will be discovered.
On the other hand, the compliance with certain protocols, even if they are very strict –
which itself is a point of contestation – cannot substitute the critical eye of the rival or
opponent. Thus, EFSA’s conclusion came under fire immediately. Dr Christopher Portier
and some 100 colleagues addressed an open letter to the European Commission to
disregard EFSA’s assessment because of, inter alia, its reliance on these studies.71 In
a companion academic article, they argued that “[c]ompliance with guidelines and
Good Laboratory Practice does not guarantee validity and relevance of the study
design, statistical rigour and attention to sources of bias”.72 There are several design
choices that become obvious here. The first is the choice of the EU legislator (or
possibly of the Commission, as discussed above) to rely predominantly on industry
studies. Then there is a set of choices made by the drafter of the guidelines – in OECD
and possibly in rival organisations. Finally, there are a number of individual or
institutional choices made by research organisations all over the world for validating their
research (eg compliance with GLP or peer-reviewed publication), thus making them
eligible for some uses and ineligible for others.
3. Animal testing versus epidemiology
Further to these choices, which are made more or less explicitly, there are pathways
selected inadvertently by some other institutional circumstances. This is illustrated by
the different weight of the experimental and the epidemiological research. For assessment
of toxicity there are two major types of studies. The first is animal studies, where a group
of lab animals are exposed to the substance under investigation and their well-being is
compared to a control group of animals in the same environment with the only difference
being that they are not subject to the treatment. This is accepted to prove causal
relationships. The trouble is that not all effects that are observed in animals will
affect humans. As it would be unethical to make similar experiments with humans,
adverse effects on humans are observed through the second major type of toxicity
68 “Carcinogenicity Study with Glyphosate Technical in Swiss Albino Mice” (2001), owned by the Israeli company
ADAMA Agan Ltd (unpublished); “Glyphosate Technical: Dietary Carcinogenicity Study in the Mouse” (2009), study
owned by the Australian company Nufarm (unpublished); “HR-001: 18-Month Oral Oncogenicity Study in Mice”
(1997), owned by the Japanese company Arysta LifeSciences Corporation (unpublished).
69 Note the other avenues for the regimentation of science here.
70 A spoof paper with obvious mistakes submitted to some 200 peer-reviewed journals was accepted by nearly half of
them; see J Bohannon, “Who’s Afraid of Peer Review?” (2013) 342 Science Magazine 60.
71 The open letter by Portier and colleagues to the European Commission is available at <https://www.efsa.europa.
eu/sites/default/files/Prof_Portier_letter.pdf> (last accessed 11 November 2019).
72 CJ Portier et al, “Differences in the carcinogenic evaluation of glyphosate between the International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)” (2016) 70 Journal of Epidemiology and
Community Health 741, 743 (with reference to JP Myers et al, “Why public health agencies cannot depend on good
laboratory practices as a criterion for selecting data” (2009) 117(3) Environmental Health Perspectives 309).





















































































































study: epidemiological studies, where the conditions of a large group of people who are
exposed to the substance anyway is compared with a similar group of people who are not
so exposed. The problem with this is that the similarity of the two groups is never
sufficient to prove causality – even if we control for factors such as age, smoking,
etc., the differences between the two groups may still be attributed to factors other
than the exposure to the substance in question.
While IARC can rely on both experimental and epidemiological studies, for EFSA it
is more difficult to rely on the latter. While animal studies can be conducted with pure
glyphosate, epidemiological studies are mostly of compounds, as glyphosate is normally
used in compounds. The available compounds vary greatly, andmany of the additives can
have adverse effects too. The broader subject of IARC’s assessment allows for the
accumulation of the studies of different mixtures. In contrast, for EFSA the other
chemicals in the mixtures are confounding factors to control for and their results will
be less conclusive,73 so it only “recognised” that the issue of the toxicity of
compounds should be studied further and that “some” studies of mixtures presented
positive results.74 Thus, the “technical” differences between the subject of assessment
of each agency determines the respective selection of the studies and influences
the weight of the different types of evidence. The implicit design choice made with
the respective terms of reference should be apparent. On the other hand, the
(im)possibility for accumulation and the difficulties with the confounding factors
provide space for individual judgments. As one of the IARC experts noticed, they
had to decide whether it is only some of the mixtures that are problematic or whether
it is glyphosate itself to blame. On the preponderance of the evidence, they
consciously decided that the latter was the case.75
By digging into so much technical detail, this section provided some evidence to
support the main argument of this article that discretion and choice are irredeemable even
in the most strictly regimented science-based risk analysis. This is a radical challenge to
the common understandings both in law and in science. Each of these enterprises is
based on the assumption that they are objective and that, if their practitioners are doing
their jobs properly, there is little choice left. While this may appear to be the case, when
we look beneath the surface we can find that even the most “technical” and controlled
issues leave some space for judgment. This is not to say, however, that conclusions in
science (or in law76) are arbitrary either. I hope I have shown that the picture is far more
nuanced and that these judgments can be based on legitimate methodological reasons
(eg preference for published/unpublished reports, peer-reviewed/proprietary research,
epidemiological studies/laboratory experiments, etc.). Thus, just like Schrödinger’s cat,
which can be dead and alive at the same time, expert conclusions can be both
predetermined (by law or by science’s own protocols) and discretionary. Even when
73 Note, however, that one of the key studies “exculpating” glyphosate – the AHS, discussed above – is epidemiological.
74 EFSA, “Conclusion on the peer review of the pesticide risk assessment of the active substance glyphosate” (2015)
13(11) EFSA Journal 4302.
75 Anonymous expert interviewed by A Arcuri; see Arcuri, supra, note 22, pp 243–44.
76 As Tribe and Dorf put it in the context of the question for objectivity of law, “to recognise the limits of human
objectivity does not require that we abandon the effort to approximate those limits”; LH Tribe and MC Dorf, “Levels of
Generality in the Definition of Rights” (1990) 57 The University of Chicago Law Review 1057.





















































































































it appears to the individual experts that they have no choice whatsoever and that every
step they make is predetermined by facts or rules, at the system level we can always
identify how small tweaks here and there could lead to very different results.
The practical implication of this bold theoretical claim is that we should be well aware
of these dynamics and design our systems for risk analysis accordingly. This is not the
case now: the science-based paradigm casts a veil of objectivity such that the space for
choice is largely unnoticed and most reform efforts are bent on “strengthening” science
and separating it even more rigidly from law or from politics.77 While the notion of
“science-based” regulation is intuitively appealing, if the analysis above is correct, all
such efforts are bound to fail because the “scientific” and the “legal” are no more
separable than the yolks and the whites in the omelette. It bears repeating that the
reason for this is not the (deficient) integrity of the experts – although sometimes this
may be the case – but that even the most technical conclusions may be dependent on
the context (ie on the “political”). I hasten to add that the entanglement with the
legal, or, indeed, with the political, does not make the “scientific” arbitrary. Nothing
in this article should be understood to mean that “Science” or scientific assessments
are always arbitrary, nor does it attempt to revive the worn-out debate on relativism. My
only claim is that science, or at least science that is relevant for regulation, cannot be
“pure”. There will always be some rules that structure decision-making in scientific
bodies and the judgments of individual experts, and even what appears to be a scientific
question will always be determined by rules (ie by law in one of its many modes of
existence) just as much as by data.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this article, I showed that science and law are entangled, like the proverbial turtles
“all the way down”. Indeed, their relationship is best illustrated by an Escher painting
(Figure 1), where the fishes and the birds shape and even constitute each other.
Furthermore, I argued that decision-making is at the same time a heavily regimented
process and a discretionary one. Even though regimentation and discretion appear to
be antithetical, this is possible: the choice is constrained, and the rules can remove it
from some places, but only to shift it to other places or to another level, often
unwittingly. The struggle for “depoliticisation” and “science-based” regulation tends
to shift discretion towards less accountable bodies upstream, but it does so by making
design choices at the political level that are by no means neutral to the content of the
scientific assessment. Thus, in my view, the right question to study is not how to
disentangle law and science or where to draw the border, but how any given border
shifts the locus of choice (discretion), what choices have been made unwittingly
when the border was drawn and what tiny but possibly decisive choices are made
with every individual scientific judgment. Finally, scholars and regulators alike
should never let the focus on “objectivity”, accountability and adherence to rules
prevent us from seeing the bigger picture and divert our attention from the plethora of
issues that any regulatory controversy places at stake.
77 The reform of the GFL (see note 20 above) is no exception, but this is beyond the scope of this article.
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